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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PREEMPTION-FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF
COMMON-LAW ClAIMs OF UNJUST DISCRIMINATION DURING
EXEMPTION OF RAIL TRANSPORTATION FROM REGULATION
UNDER STAGGERS RAIL ACT

G. & T. Terminal Packaging Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (1987)
In the wake of Congress' efforts to return economic regulation to
the marketplace through "deregulation," courts have been forced to determine the extent to which Congress intended to preempt' states from
regulating in the absence of federal regulation. 2 As the Supreme Court
1. The doctrine of federal preemption is derived from the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, which provides that the Constitution and the
laws made by the federal government "shall be the Supreme Law of the Land."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Two types of preemption have emerged from federal
jurisprudence: express preemption and- implied preemption. Express preemption exists when a statute expressly forbids a certain type of state regulation or
expressly requires the exclusivity of federal regulation. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 543 (1977) (federal labeling requirement on packageI bacon expressly preempted state labeling requirements). In the absence of
express language, preemption may be implied. A determination of this nature is
necessarily a matter of statutory construction, and requires an examination of
the jurisdictional and substantive components of the federal enactment. See L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-29 (2d ed. 1988). If Congress evidences an intent to "occupy the field" through a given enactment, state action
which falls within that field may be preempted regardless of how consistent that
action might be with substantive federal policy. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04
(1983) (federal government occupies field of nuclear safety regulation, but states
may condition plant construction upon disposal site approval); cf.Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1985) (mere
comprehensiveness of agency regulation not sufficient to preempt; must be
stronger evidence of intent). When Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation, state action will be preempted to the extent that, substantively, it
actually and irreconcilably conflicts with the operation or purpose of federal law.
Such conflict may arise when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 14243 (1963) ("[F]ederal exclusion of state law is inescapable ...where compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce."). Or, it may arise when the state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (invalidating
state alien registration law given federal statute with same regulatory objective).
2. The courts are forced to determine Congress' intent to continue to occupy a given field of regulation after the regulation is removed, to the exclusion
of state administrative and court action. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipeline
Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 424 (1986) ("In light of Congress'
intent to move toward a less regulated national natural gas market, its decision
to remove jurisdiction from [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] cannot be
interpreted as an invitation to the States to impose additional regulations."); G.
& T. Terminal Packaging Co. v. Consolidated Rail Co., 830 F.2d 1230, 1234-35

(635)
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of the United States explained: "[A] federal decision to forgo regulation
in a given area may imply an authoritative federal determination that the
area is best left unregulated and in that event would have as much preemptive force as a decision to regulate."'3 With respect to rail transportation, Congress decided not to deregulate completely. 4 Rather than
dismantle the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), Congress
amended the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) 5 with two pieces of deregulatory legislation: the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4 R Act), 6 and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. 7 One
purpose of these amendments was to allow, "to the maximum extent
possible," rail rates to be determined through competition in the
marketplace. 8
To achieve this goal, Congress commanded the ICC to exempt rail
transportation from regulation when the ICC determined that the federal transportation policy9 would be promoted without regulation. 10
(3d Cir. 1987) (common-law actions for unjust discrimination preempted by Interstate Commerce Commission even during exemption from regulation pursuant to Staggers Rail Act), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1281 (1988). See generally Foote,
Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV.

1429 (1984); Pierce, Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism and Administrative Law:
Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 607 (1985).

3. Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
375, 384 (1983) (emphasis in original).
4. See The Captive Shippers Issue Seven Years After Staggers Enactment, PUB. UTIL.
Jan. 7, 1988 [hereinafter Captive Shippers] ("In providing a partial
deregulation of the rail carriers, the act attempted to strike a balance between
the economic needs of the railroads and what the act called 'captive shippers'those shippers dependent upon one market dominant carrier to move its
product.").
Several commentators have expressed concern about deregulation of the
transportation industry. See, e.g., Dempsey, TransportationDeregulation. On a Collision Course?, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 329, 392 (1981) ("[R]easonable economic regulaFORTNIGHTLY,

tion of transportation was and is essential in order to protect the public

interest."); Captive Shippers, supra at 25 ("though the Staggers Rail Act has revitalized the railroad industry, controversy persists over the effectiveness of the Act
in protecting shippers from rail carriers' abusive monopolistic practices.").
5. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917 (1984).
6. 45 U.S.C. §§ 801-802 (1982).
7. 49 U.S.C. § 10101a (1982).
8. 49 U.S.C. § 1010la(l) (1982).
9. Id.

10. 49 U.S.C. § 10505(a)(1) (1982). The exemption authority of the ICC
provides in pertinent part:
§ 10505. Authority to exempt rail carrier transportation
"(a) In a matter related to a rail carrier providing transportation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
under this subchapter, the Commission shall exempt a person, class of
persons, or a transaction or service when the Commission finds that the
application of a provision of this subtitle"(1)
is not necessary to carry out the transportation policy of
section 10101a of this title; and
"(2) either (A) the transaction or service is of limited scope,
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One specific provision of the national transportation policy prohibits unlawful discrimination," l and, under the ICA, shippers can seek redress
from a carrier that unjustly discriminates. 1 2 However, in the Staggers
Rail Act, Congress amended the savings clause of the ICA which provides that remedies are in addition to those existing at common law, by
adding that those remedies are available "except as otherwise provided
in this subtitle."' 13 Congress further amended the ICA in the Staggers
Rail Act by providing that "[the jurisdiction of the [ICC] ...over trans-

portation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this title with
respect to the rates, classifications, rules and practices of such carriers is
exclusive."14
In G. & T. Terminal PackagingCo. v. ConsolidatedRail Co. , 15 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether shippers' common-law claims for unlawful discrimination were preempted
when the ICC exempted rail rates from regulation. 16 The G & T court
held that the text and legislative history of the subtitle which provided
for exclusive remedies demonstrated Congress' intent to preempt common-law claims. 1 7 Furthermore, the court held that, in giving the ICC
the power to revoke an exemption, Congress intended that the ICC have
ongoing, exclusive jurisdiction over exempt traffic.iS Additionally, the
or (B) the application of a provision of this subtitle is not needed to
protect shippers from the abuse of market power.
"(b) The Commission may, where appropriate, begin a proceeding under this section on its own initiative or on application by the Secretary of Transportation or an interested party.
"(c) The Commission may specify the period of time during
which an exemption granted under this section is effective.
"(d) The Commission may revoke an exemption, to the extent it
specifies, when it finds that application of this subtitle to the person,
class or transportation is necessary to carry out the transportation policy of section 10101a of this title ...."
49 U.S.C. 10505 (1982). The preemptive effect of the exemption provision has
been the subject of litigation. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Texas,
107 S.Ct. 787, 790 (1987) ("[Tlhe Commission's power to grant... [trailer on
flat car] exemptions from state regulation is coextensive with its own authority
to regulate, or not to regulate, these intermodal movements by rail carriers.");
Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. ICC, 749 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (states preempted from altering exemption provisions); see also Texas v. United States, 730
F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1984) (certification requirement for states to regulate during
exemption constitutional).
11. 49 U.S.C. § 1010la(13) (1982). Common carriers are specifically prohibited from unjustly discriminating. See 49 U.S.C. § 10741 (1982).
12. 49 U.S.C. § 11701 (1982).
13. 49 U.S.C. § 10103(a) (1982).
14. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(d) (1982).
15. 830 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1281 (1988).
16. Id. at 1233-35.
17. Id. at 1234.
18. Id. at 1235. The ICC's revocation authority is contained in the exemption provision at 49 U.S.C. § 10505(d) (1982). For the text of this provision, see
supra note 10 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 8
638

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. 635

court reasoned that to permit common-law claims would effectively substitute the court's regulation for the ICC's decision not to regulate. 19
This Casebrief will discuss the factual and procedural background
of the case, and will review the court's majority and dissenting opinions
concerning whether common-law claims are preempted by the Staggers
Rail Act. This Casebrief will argue that the Staggers Rail Act does not
demonstrate sufficient congressional intent to preempt common-law
claims. Furthermore, this Casebrief will argue that had the court
reached this result, it should then have considered whether the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction acts to bar common-law claims of unjust discrimination. This Casebrief will conclude that the court should have allowed
the common-law claims to stand.
In 1983, the ICC exempted rail transportation of agricultural commodities from regulation pursuant to'its congressional deregulatory
mandate. 20 As a shipper of potatoes, G. & T. Terminal Packaging Co.
(G & T)2 1 was subject to this exemption.2 2 G & T filed numerous claims
against its carrier, Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail), 23 for damaged
goods, 24 and in response to those claims Conrail imposed a surcharge
25
on all rail shipments to G & T.
Following a letter from the ICC which explained that the Commission no longer exercised jurisdiction over matters relating to rail rates, 2 6
G & T filed a complaint in federal district court. 27 G & T argued on
statutory, common-law and constitutional grounds that Conrail's rates
19. Id.

20. Ex Parte No. 436 (sub. no. 2), Rail General Exemption Authority-Miscellaneous Agricultural Commodities, 367 I.C.C. 298 (1983). In its decision, the ICC explained that "continued regulation of those commodities no longer appear[s]
necessary to serve the Nation's transportation policy objectives or to protect
shippers from abuse of market power by the railroads." Id.at 298.
21. Several shippers brought the action, including G & T, Mr. Sprout, Inc.,
Tray Wrap, Inc., and Mr. Anthony Spinale. 830 F.2d at 1231 n.1. Mr. Spinale is
the president and sole stockholder of G & T. G. & T. Terminal Packaging Co. v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 646 F. Supp. 511, 512 (D.N.J. 1986), afd, 830 F.2d
1230 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1281 (1988).
22. 830 F.2d at 1231-32.
23. Id. at 1232. Conrail is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the railroad business. G & T, 646 F. Supp. at 512.
24. 830 F.2d at 1232.
25. Id. An internal Conrail memorandum indicated that one of the plaintiff
shipper's claims exceeded Conrail's revenues. Id.
26. Id. G & T wrote a letter to the chairman of the ICC to inquire whether
the ICC retained jurisdiction over G & T's claims against Conrail, in which G &
T alleged that Conrail had imposed unlawfully discriminatory rates. Id. The
director of the ICC's Office of Proceedings, writing for the chairman, responded
that the ICC "no longer exercise[d] jurisdiction over the rates charged by railroads" and further explained that G & T would have to resort to the courts to
settle its dispute. Id. (quoting Letter from Herbert Hardy, Director of the Office
of Proceedings, ICC, to G & T (Oct. 11, 1983)).
27. Id.
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were discriminatory and unlawful. 2 8 Conrail moved for summary judgment, and the district court dismissed G & T's statutory and constitu29
tional claims, but allowed G & T's common law action to stand.
Conrail subsequently filed a petition with the ICC seeking a declaratory order that G & T's common-law claims were preempted.3 0 Contrary to its previous letter to G & T, the ICC decided that, despite the
exemption of rail transportation of agricultural commodities, the ICC
retained jurisdiction over allegations of rate discrimination, and that G
& T had no independent common-law cause of action.3 ' Conrail renewed its motion for summary judgment of G & T's common-law claim
based upon the ICC's declaratory order, as well as upon the Supreme
Court's 1986 decision in TranscontinentalGas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and
Gas Board of Mississippi.3 2 In Transcontinental, the Court held that states
were preempted from regulating first sales of natural gas when Congress
had exempted such sales from regulation.3 3 The district court granted
Conrail's motion and G & T appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed
the district court's dismissal of G & T's statutory, common-law and constitutional claims.3 4 The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
35
the statutory and constitutional claims without dissent.
28. Id. For a discussion of the substance of the claims and the Third Circuit's treatment of them, see infra notes 34-65 and accompanying text.
29. 646 F. Supp. at 512.
30. 830 F.2d at 1232.
31. Id. (citing Consolidated Rail Corporation-DeclaratoryOrder-Exemption, 1
I.C.C.2d 895 (1987)). The Commission noted that Mr. Hardy's previous letter
to G & T was not binding on the Commission. Id. at 1232 n.2 (citing Consolidated
Rail Corporation-DeclaratoryOrder-Exemption, 1 I.C.C.2d 895 (1987)).
32. 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
33. Id. at 425. In Transcontinental, the Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board
attempted to regulate the first sale of natural gas within the state by prohibiting
producers from discriminating among numerous buyers of the gas. Id. at 414.
The Supreme Court held that the exemption given by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission preempted such state regulation. Id. at 425.
34. 830 F.2d at 1233.
35. Id. at 1233, 1236. Judge Aldisert dissented with respect to the preemption of G & T's common-law claims. Id. at 1236 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
G & T's statutory argument was that Conrail's surcharges violated section
11707 of the ICA because they served as a defacto bar to G & T's recovery for
lost and damaged goods under that provision. 830 F.2d at 1233. Under section
11707, shippers can recover costs for lost and damaged goods, and carriers are
prohibited from avoiding these claims. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. 11707(a)(1) & (c)(1)
(1982)). The Third Circuit rejected this argument on the grounds that the
surcharges would not affect G & T's ability to recover damages under the ICA,
and that "[t]he shippers cite no authority-statutory, regulatory, or judicial-for
the proposition that carrier liability under section 11707 is not a cost which may
be taken into account in fixing rates." Id.
On constitutional grounds, G & T argued that the surcharges deprived it of
liberty and property interests without due process of law. Id. at 1236. The
Third Circuit rejected this argument on the ground that, because the weight of
precedent indicates that Conrail is a private actor with respect to constitutional
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With regard to whether G & T's common-law claims were preempted after the ICC had exempted agricultural commodities from regulation, the court accepted arguendo that carriers were subject to
common-law claims for discriminatory rates prior to the passage of the
ICA. 36 The court noted, however, that under the Supreme Court's decision in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,37 common-law
38
actions for rate discrimination were to be brought before the ICC.
The court thus framed G & T's contention to be whether Congress intended to restore common-law remedies in disputes arising out of rail
39
transportation which the ICC had exempted from regulation.
The court recognized that, in passing the 4 R Act and the Staggers
Rail Act, Congress intended to give the railroads greater freedom to set
their own rates. 40 The court rejected the suggestion that Congress' decision to decrease the ICC's ratemaking role was evidence that Congress
intended "to resurrect common law remedies moribund since 1907. ' ' 41

To refute this contention the court noted that in passing the Staggers
Rail Act Congress expressly amended the ICA by providing that "the
jurisdiction of the Commission ... over transportation by rail carriers,

and the remedies provided in this title with respect to rates, classifications, rules and practice[s] of such carriers, is exclusive."142 The court
resolved the ambiguity whether this section gave the ICC exclusive jurisdiction over remedies provided in the ICA, or over remedies generally,
in favor of finding exclusive jurisdiction over remedies generally. 4 3 In
analysis, G & T failed to demonstrate governmental action. Id. (citing RendallBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)); Morin v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 810
F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1987); Myron v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 752 F.2d 50 (2d
Cir. 1985); Wenzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 464 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa.), afd,
612 F.2d 536 (3d Cir. 1979)).
36. Id. at 1234.
37. 204 U.S. 426 (1907). In Abilene Cotton, shippers brought a common-law
suit against the defendant railroad claiming that the railroad's rates were unjustly discriminatory. Id. at 430. The Supreme Court concluded that "a shipper
seeking reparation predicated upon the unreasonableness of the established rate
must, under the act to regulate commerce, primarily invoke redress through the
Interstate Commerce Commission, which body alone is vested with power originally to entertain proceedings for the alteration of an established schedule .. .
Id. at 448.
38. 830 F.2d at 1234. The court observed that "[f]rom the time Abilene Cotton Oil was decided to date, no case has permitted a shipper to challenge a
freight rate in a common law action." Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.(citing 45 U.S.C. § 803(b)(3) (1982); 49 U.S.C. § 1010la(l) (1982)).
41. Id. 1907 is the year in which the Supreme Court decided Abilene Cotton.
For a discussion of Abilene Cotton, see supra note 37 and infra notes 83-88 and
accompanying text.

42. Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 10501(d) (1982)). The court viewed this provision as "expressly codiflying] the holding of Abilene Cotton." Id. For a discussion

of how section 10501(d) can be viewed as different from the holding of Abilene
Cotton, see infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.

43. 830 F.2d at 1234.
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support of its interpretation, the court looked to the legislative history
of the section, which emphasized that "[n]o state law or federal or state
common law remedies are available." ' 44 The court found that this provision overrode the savings clause of the ICA, which states that "[eixcept
as otherwise provided," remedies are in addition to those at common
law. 4 5 G & T argued that the provision calling for exclusive remedies
before the ICC should be construed to the effect that the ICC only has
jurisdiction over remedies with respect to rates when the Commission
exercises its ratemaking authority, but that the ICC forfeits its jurisdic46
tion over such remedies when it has exercised its exemption authority.
Again, the court was unwilling to take such a literal approach to the
47
ICC's jurisdiction over remedies.
The court also noted that such a construction of the statute would
be "inconsistent with the statutory scheme" of the ICC's "ongoing jurisdiction over exempt traffic," based upon the ICC's power to revoke an
exemption. 48 The court further asserted that "[r]ecognition of a common-law remedy with respect to rates would have the effect of substituting a court's regulation for the Commission's decision in favor of
deregulation."'4 9 The court viewed this situation to be in conflict with
Congress' intent to permit rail rates, once exempt from regulation, to be
set by the marketplace, subject to revocation only by the ICC. 50 Thus,
the court determined that relief was unavailable until the ICC revoked
44. Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 106,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3978, 4110, 4138). The text

of the legislative history provides:
The remedies available against rail carriers with respect to rail rates,
classifications, rules and practices are exclusively those provided by the
Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, and any other federal statutes
which are not inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce Act. No state
law or federal or state common law remedies are available.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 106, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

NEWS 3978, 4138.

45. 830 F.2d at 1234 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 10501(d) (1982)). The court
further asserted that "[tihe explicit legislative intent that only federal statutory
remedies exist is precisely the type of exception contemplated by the savings
provision." Id. For the text of section 10501(d), see supra note 10.
46. 830 F.2d at 1234.
47. The court reasoned that "[t]he only possible textual support for such
an interpretation of the section in the literal reading rejected above [in determining that the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over the provision of remedies
with respect to rates.]" Id.
48. Id. at 1234-35 (quoting Coal Exporters Ass'n v. United States, 745 F.2d
76, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1072 (1985)) ("Congress [intended]
that 'there be continuing evaluation of the appropriateness of regulation and
continuing deregulation where consistent with the Act's policies'. ").
49. Id.

50. Id. at 1235. The court's rationale for this judgment was that "[t]he
ongoing jurisdiction to reconsider the exemption in light of competitive conditions is conferred in the first instance on the Commission, not on the courts."
Id.
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the exemption. 5' Furthermore, according to the court, such a result was
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Transcontinental as well
52
as with the decisions of other federal courts.
In its conclusion, the court responded to the criticism of Judge Aldisert in his dissent 53 that the decision leaves shippers without a remedy. 54 The majority rejected this argument on the ground that the ICC,
in granting the exemption, had already determined that "regulation is
not needed to protect shippers from abuse of market power," 55 and that
G & T could either use some alternate mode of transportation or seek
56
revocation of the exemption from the ICC.

57
In dissent, Judge Aldisert disagreed on the preemption issue.
Judge Aldisert agreed with the majority that Congress enacted the Staggers Act to allow competition in the marketplace to set rail rates5 8 and
that the ICC was to exempt rail traffic when regulation was not necessary
to carry out the federal transportation policy. 59 He noted, however, that
Congress expressly provided that one goal of the federal transportation
policy is "to prohibit unlawful discrimination." ' 60 In addition, Congress
expressly preserved common-law remedies in the savings clause of the

51. Id. The court reasoned that, until the ICC determined that Conrail
"dominant" over G & T, the "court [could not] grant relief' to G & T. Id.
ing Bessemer and Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. ICC, 691 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1982),
denied, 462 U.S. 1110 (1983)).
52. Id. (citing Transcontinental,474 U.S. 409 (1986); Alliance Shippers,

was
(citcert.
Inc.

v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1005 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Pittsburgh
Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., No. 84-1267 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25,
1986)). In its citation to Transcontinental, the court noted that the Supreme
Court's decision in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976), was
inapposite in the instant case. Id. at 1235 n.3. The court explained that whereas
in Nader the plaintiffs tort claim could be recognized "without intruding upon
any judgment of the regulatory agency ... recognition of [shippers' claims] for
discriminatory rates would involve case-by-case judicial regulation of rates ...
Id.
53. See id. at 1238-39 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1235-36.
55. Id. at 1235 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 10505(a)(2)(B) (1982)).
56. Id. at 1236. ChiefJudge Gibbons stated that "Congress and the Commission have determined that the market is adequate protection; it is not the
place of this court to disagree with that determination." Id.
57. Id. at 1236 (Aldisert,J., dissenting). He began his analysis with the precept that preemption is a question of congressional intent, and that "repeals of
common-law remedies by implication are not favored: a statute will not be construed as taking away a common law right unless the right is so repugnant that it
renders the statute's provisions nugatory." Id. (Aldisert,J., dissenting) (quoting
Abilene Cotton, 204 U.S. at 437).
58. Id. at 1236-37 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4110, 4111).
59. Id. at 1237 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10505 (1982)).
60. Id. (Aldisert,J., dissenting) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1010la(13)). The text of
section 10101a(13) provides that the policy of the United States government in
regulating the railroad industry is "to prohibit predatory pricing and practices to
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ICA. 6 ' Thus, according to Judge Aldisert, one can "inescapably" conclude that "common law remedies are. available inter alia to prohibit un62
lawful discrimination."In support of his position, Judge Aldisert observed that unlawful
63
discrimination was not permitted before Congress passed the ICA,
that it is not permitted under the ICA and that under the Act shippers
are entitled to relief for unlawful discrimination. 64 However, in Judge
Aldisert's interpretation, because the remedial provisions of the ICA do
not apply during an exemption and because Congress intended for remedies to exist in order to further the policy of prohibiting unlawful discrimination, common-law remedies are necessary to promote Congress'
65
intent.
Judge Aldisert criticized Conrail's position because it allowed G & T
merely an opportunity to petition for revocation of the exemption, and
not an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the unlawful discrimination claims. 6 6 He contended that such a remedy would be inadequate
not only because shippers would be forced to overcome the initial burden of proving the need for revocation, but because a revocation order
avoid undue concentrations of market power and to prohibit unlawful discrimination." 49 U.S.C. § 1010la(13) (emphasis added).
61. 830 F.2d at 1237 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10103).
62. Id. at 1237 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1237-38. (Aldisert,J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert briefly surveyed
the existence of actions for discriminatory rates at common law. Id. (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting) (citing Messenger v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 37 N.J.L. 531 (1874)
(railroads as common carriers "owe[] an equal duty to all and . . . cannot ...
make unequal preferences"); McDuffee v. Portland and Rochester R.R., 52 N.H.
430, 450 (1873) (unreasonable discrimination violates common right, amounts
to "insubordination and mutiny," and is actionable at common law); London &
N.W. Ry. Co. v. Evershed, 3 App. Cas. 1029 (House of Lords 1878) ("The one
right ... of a public trader is to see that he is receiving from a railway company
equal treatment with other traders of the same kind doing the same business and
supplying the same traffic.")).
64. 830 F.2d at 1238 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10741
(1982) (prohibiting unreasonable discrimination between shippers when providing substantially similar services); 49 U.S.C. § 11701 (1982) (providing remedy
for unjust discrimination before the ICC)).
65. 830 F.2d at 1238 (Aldisert,J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert reasoned that
"in light of Congress' policy 'to prohibit unlawful discrimination,' .. . it seems to
me that Congress did not intend to leave shippers without a remedy for discriminatory conduct practiced by rail carriers exempted from regulation. A common
law action would provide such a remedy. And Congress expressly anticipated
Id. (Aldisert, J., dissentI..."
this under the savings clause of the Staggers Act .
ing) (citations omitted). For the court's contrary view on this point, see supra
notes 45-47 and 53-56 and accompanying text.
66. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert asserted that under the
court's view "the shipper is only given the right to petition the ICC to withdraw
its exemption and restore regulation of the entire railroad industry's transportation of potatoes. A proceeding to restore regulation of the entire railroad industry is not the mirror image of a proceeding to prove discrimination against a
particular shipper by a particular carrier." Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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would have only prospective application, 6 7 and, therefore, would not
provide a shipper with compensatory damages. 68 Judge Aldisert further
reasoned that the two remedies proposed by the majority, that shippers
either petition the ICC for revocation of an exemption or seek alternative means of shipment, could lead to irreparable harm to shippers, and
therefore could not have been intended by Congress as the exclusive
69
remedies.
Judge Aldisert also rejected Conrail's argument, based on the
Supreme Court's decisions in Abilene Cotton and Transcontinental, that to

allow common-law remedies would conflict with the federal regulatory
scheme and would create a lack of uniformity among the states. 70 He
gave two reasons for rejecting this argument. First, he denied that there
would be any conflict; because common-law claims would be allowed
only during periods of exemption, when there would be no regulation
with which to conflict. 7 '

Second, the ICC could revoke the exemption

67. Id. at 1238-39 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). In Judge Aldisert's interpretation, "the proceedings before the Commission would not take place in a judicially neutral ambience; the petitioner would have the very high burden of
overcoming the legislatively-declared public policy of minimal Federal regulatory control." Id. at 1239 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (AldisertJ., dissenting). To Judge Aldisert, this was "the black hole
of Conrail's theory," that the ICC would have no power to provide a remedy for
unlawful discrimination during an exemption period. Id. (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting).
69. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert concluded that when "the
Commission has surrendered its jurisdiction over a field of rail transportation by
granting an exemption pursuant to the Staggers Act, a common-law remedy ex-

ists under the savings clause of the Act to remedy unlawful discrimination practiced by rail carriers during the exemption period." Id. (Aldisert,J., dissenting)
(citing First Pa. Bank v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1113, 1120 (3d Cir.
1984) (following deregulation of the Civil Aeronautics Board courts were free to
apply common-law rules to airline rates)).
70. Id. at 1239-40 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting). On this point, Judge Aldisert relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290
(1976). In Nader, the Court permitted the plaintiffs to bring a common-law suit
for misrepresentation without first requiring them to present their claim to the
Civil Aeronautics Board. See 426 U.S. at 308. Judge Aldisert found the
Supreme Court's analysis in Nader, in which the Court distinguished the plaintiffs' claims from those in Abilene Cotton, persuasive with respect to G & T's
claims:

In Abilene the carrier, if subject to both agency and court sanctions,
would be put in an untenable position when the agency and a court
disagreed on the reasonableness of a rate. The carrier could not abide
by the rate filed with the Commission, as required by statute, and also
comply with a court's determination that the rate was excessive. The
conflict between the court's common-law authority and the agency's
ratemaking power was direct and unambiguous. The court in the present
case, in contrast, is not called upon to substitute its judgment for the agency's on
the reasonableness of a rate-or, indeed, on the reasonablenessof any carrierpractice.
830 F.2d at 1240 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (quoting Nader, 426 U.S. at 299-300
(emphasis supplied by court)).
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and reassert jurisdiction at any time that it determined that common-law
72
remedies were not advancing the federal transportation policy.
Finally, Judge Aldisert stated that the preemption of common-law
remedies "blurs the distinction between regulation of rail rates and adjudication of a tort ..

. .

73 He argued that Transcontinentalwas inappo-

site in the instant case because in Transcontinentalthe Supreme Court was
concerned with direct regulation on the part of a state administrative
agency, and not with an adjudication of a tort within the courts.74 He
recognized that the federal deregulation preempts state regulation, but
he expressed his unwillingness to extend deregulation to common-law
75
claims by treating common-law claims as defacto regulation.
It is submitted that the court incorrectly held G & T's common-law
claims to be preempted under the Staggers Rail Act, because the language, legislative history and policy of the Act do not manifest sufficient
congressional intent to support such a holding. The Third Circuit did
not specifically address whether it was engaging in express or implied
preemption analysis. This distinction is critical when considering the
preemption of common-law claims: the Supreme Court has established
that, in the absence of express or compelling congressional intent, a
strong presumption exists against the preemption of traditional state
functions, 7 6 such as the provision of common-law remedies. 7 7 Because
72. 830 F.2d at 1240 (Aldisert,J., dissenting) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10505(d)
(1982)).
73. Id. at 1240-41 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert argued that
courts adjudicate and do not regulate, and therefore should not be subject to the
same restrictions as a state administrative agency. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting)
For an alternative interpretation of the court's regulatory function, see infra
notes 110-121 and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 1240 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1241 (Aldisert,J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987)
(traditional interest in health and safety prevents Clean Water Act from preempting common-law claims of nuisance against source-state pollutors); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719-20
(1985) (state regulation of blood plasma, as traditional interest in health and
safety, not preempted by Food and Drug Administration regulations); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("Where... the field that Congress
is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the states 'we start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of

Congress'. " (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)); see also Note, A Frameworkfor Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 374
(1978) ("Territorial protection of vital interests ...is the category that is most

impervious to preemption.").
77. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (common-law claims of nuisance not preempted by Clean Water Act); Silkwood v.
Kerr McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (punitive damage awards as part of
common-law claims not preempted by jurisdiction of Nuclear Regulatory Commission); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)

(traditional common-law tort claims in "maintenance of domestic peace" not
preempted by jurisdiction of National Labor Relations Board); but cf. Farmers
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the Staggers Rail Act does not expressly provide for the preemption of
common-law claims for unjust discrimination during an exemption, 78
and because such claims are consistent with Congress' objectives in exempting rail traffic, 79 the Third Circuit should have found that G & T's
common-law claims were not preempted. Had the court reached this
properly circumscribed result, it should then have considered whether
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction8 0 would have required G & T to
present its claims first to the ICC despite the exemption.8 1 It is submitted that G & T's claims, which are based upon traditional notions of
common-carrier tort liability, are within the courts' expertise to resolve
and the court would not have been required to invoke the ICC's primary
82
jurisdiction.
The G & T court's first error was its assumption that federal preemption of common-law claims for unjust discrimination has existed
since the Supreme Court's 1907 decision in Abilene Cotton.8 3 In Abilene
Cotton, the Supreme Court determined that issues of rate reasonableness
must be resolved first by the ICC, 84 but the Court did not reach its deciEduc. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) (common-law claims
of defamation involving broadcasts governed by equal opportunity broadcast
provisions of Federal Communications Act impliedly preempted).
78. For a discussion of the absence of express congressional intent to preempt common-law claims by the Staggers Rail Act, see infra notes-94-109 and
accompanying text. For the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that G & T's
claims were based on state common law, and that the district court had diversity
jurisdiction based upon Conrail and G & T's incorporation in Pennsylvania and
New York, respectively and upon sufficient jurisdictional amount in controversy.
See supra notes 21, 23 & 25.
79. For a discussion of Congress' objectives in exempting rail traffic, see
infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
80. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction presents a framework for allocating powers between courts and agencies. United States v. Western Pac. R.R.
Co., 352 U.S. 59, 65 (1956). The doctrine applies "where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a
case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views." Id. at 63-64. For a thorough discussion of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction generally, see 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 22 (1983); L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
121-40 (1965).
81. For a discussion of the need to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in the present case, see infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of G & T's claims under a primary jurisdiction analysis,
see infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
83. See 830 F.2d at 1235. In G & T, the Third Circuit implicitly treated
Abilene Cotton as a preemption case when it stated that "we agree with the district
court that the shippers' common law claims ... are preempted. Abilene Cotton is
still the controlling rule." Id. For a further discussion of the court's treatment
of Abilene Cotton as a case involving federal preemption, see supra note 37-42 and
accompanying text.
84. Abilene Cotton, 204 U.S. 426, 442 (1907). The Court specifically stated:
"[Tlhe independent right of an individual originally to maintain actions in
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sion on supremacy clause grounds. Indeed, the Court recognized that
its decision was necessarily contrary to Congress' statement in the ICA
that the remedies provided by the ICC were in addition to those available at common law. 85 Rather, the Court determined that in order for
the ICC to function properly in setting uniform standards for rail rates,
shipper's claims for overcharges and rate discrimination must be
brought before the ICC as an initial matter.8 6 The Court's decision was

an application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, 8 7 which operates
when a claim originally cognizable in the courts "requires the resolution
placed within the
of issues which; under a regulatory scheme, have been
88
special competence of the administrative agency."
Thus, the G & T court's reliance onAbilene Cotton as the centerpiece

of its preemption analysis was misplaced. The continuing validity of a
decision based upon primary jurisdiction is highly uncertain when the
regulatory scheme upon which the decision was based is removed
through deregulation. 89 Furthermore, in a case subsequent to Abilene
Cotton, 90 the Supreme Court expressly held that the primary jurisdiction
of the ICC did not defeat all common-law claims of unjust
discrimination. 91
courts to obtain pecuniary redress for violations of the act ... must be confined
to redress of such wrongs as can, consistently with the context of the act, be
redressed by courts without previous action by the Commission, and, therefore,
does not imply the power in a court to primarily hear complaints concerning the
wrongs of the character of the one here complained of." Id.
85. Id. at 446, 448. As Professor Davis observed: "The primary jurisdiction principle was sufficiently strong in the Abilene case to override the unambiguous statutory words in the provisions that remedies at common law continued."
K. DAVIS, supra note 80, at 89.
86. 204 U.S. at 440-42.
87. See K. DAVIS, supra note 80, at 88-89. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is believed to have originated in Abilene Cotton. Id. at 88.
88. United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956) (issue in
tariff rate dispute whether de-fused napalm bomb was "incendiary bomb" or
"gasoline in steel drums" within primary jurisdiction of ICC).
89. See First Pa. Bank v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir.
1984). The First Pennsylvania court described this effect with respect to the regulation of airline rates for shipping packages:
With respect to rates, a succinct statement of the effect of deregulation
would be that the [Civil Aeronautics Board] was shorn of its powers to
pass upon the reasonableness of rates for interstate air transportation
of property, and to prescribe future rates to replace those found to be
unreasonable. Abolition of these powers of the CAB simply abrogated
pro tanto the doctrine of 'primary jurisdiction' with respect to such rates.
The courts were thus left free to proceed without circuity to apply directly the familiar federal common law rules relating to the subject matter of released value rates [limiting liability for shipment of goods].
Id. at 1120.
90. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121 (1914).
91. See id. at 130. The Supreme Court stated: "The [Interstate Commerce
Act] did not supersede the jurisdiction of state courts in any case, new or old,
where the decision did not involve the determination of matters calling for the
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Against this background, the Third Circuit incorrectly assumed that
the holding of Abilene Cotton was still valid and that it stood for the proposition that Congress had preempted common-law remedies. From
these assumptions, the G & T court's next error was to frame the issue in
the case too narrowly. Rather than examine the Staggers Rail Act to
determine whether Congress intended "to resurrect common law remedies moribund since 1907,"192 the court should have asked whether in
the Staggers Rail Act Congress for the first time intended to preempt
common-law remedies. This distinction is essential because of a shift in
presumption: if Congress had preempted common-law claims from the
time of Abilene Cotton, then the presumption would be that preemption
continues unless Congress otherwise manifested its intent in the Staggers Rail Act. But where the claims have been barred on the basis of
primary jurisdiction, which operates on the assumption that the claims
are originally cognizable in the courts, a heavy burden remains to show that
Congress intended to preempt common-law claims in the face of
93
deregulation.
In its analysis of the preemptive effect of the Staggers Rail Act, the
court properly focused on the section which provides that "[t]he jurisdiction of the [ICC] . . . over transportation by rail carriers, and the
remedies provided in this title with respect to the rates, classifications,
rules and practice[s] of such carriers, is exclusive."' 94 The court recognized two ambiguities in interpreting this section: first, that the ICC
might have exclusive jurisdiction only over those remedies actually provided; and second, that the ICC might only have exclusive jurisdiction
when the ICC actually regulates rates, but that it does not retain exclusive jurisdiction when it exempts rail rates. 9 5 The court believed that
the legislative history to this section, which states that "[n]o state law or
federal or state common law remedies are available," 9 6 resolved the amexercise of the administrative power and discretion of the Commission .... " Id.
For a discussion of how the Supreme Court's analysis in Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co. should have been applied to deregulation under
the Staggers Rail Act in the G & T case, see infra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
92. 830 F.2d at 1234.
93. This is so because deregulation abrogates the agency's primary jurisdic-

tion, and returns the matter to the courts. See First Pa. Bank v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 731 F.2d 1113, 1122 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Deregulation [of the Civil Aeronautics Board] . .. merely did away with the applicability of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.").
94. 830 F.2d at 1234 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 10501(d) (1982)). For a detailed
discussion of the court's analysis of this section, see supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
95. 830 F.2d at 1234.
96. Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-1470, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 106,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3978, 4138).
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biguities against G & T's "literal '" 9 7 reading of the statute, and in favor
of preemption of common-law remedies at all times. Even with this legislative history, however, ambiguity persists whether Congress intended
to preempt common-law remedies during an exemption. While it is unambiguous that Congress expressly preempted common-law remedies
when the ICC exercises its regulatory powers, even the G & T majority
admitted that a literal reading of the statute suggests that the ICC does
not retain exclusive jurisdiction over remedies when it exempts rail rates
from regulation.9" Furthermore, the legislative history does not address
this issue; it explains only how, and not when, the provision for exclusive
remedies is to apply. 9 9 The need for a plain and unmistakable statement
in the statute itself is particularly compelling when a court is considering
the preemption of a traditional state function in the absence of regulation,
and the ambiguous jurisdictional statement is not sufficient to overcome
this presumption.
Because the text and legislative history of this jurisdictional provision are ambiguous with respect to Congress' intent, it is necessary to
examine other relevant provisions of the Staggers Rail Act to determine
whether Congress intended to preempt common-law remedies during
periods of exemption. As Judge Aldisert noted in his dissent, Congress
both expressly prohibited unjust discrimination as a matter of national
transportation policy, ' 0 0 and expressly provided that this policy must be
promoted as a condition of exemption.' 0 ' He also noted that Congress
expressly saved common-law remedies in the savings clause.' 0 2 For
Congress to give the ICC exclusive jurisdiction over remedies "provided," and yet at the same time to maintain in the savings clause that,
"except as otherwise provided," remedies are in addition to those at
common law,' 0 3 Congress must have intended for common-law remedies to be preserved when the ICC does not provide a remedial scheme,
such as during periods of exemption.' 0 4 Although this conclusion may
not be "inescapable," as Judge Aldisert contends, 10 5 it does have extremely strong textual support in Congress' intent which underlies the
above provisions of the Staggers Rail Act.
The next error in the G & T court's preemption analysis was to
97. 830 F.2d at 1234. The court twice referred to G & T's statutory interpretation as "literal." Id.
98. See id.
99. For the text of the legislative history, see supra note 44.
100. Id. at 1237 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1010la(13)
(1982)). For a discussion of Judge Aldisert's analysis of Congress' intent, see
supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
101. Id. (Aldisert,J., dissenting) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10505 (1982)). For the
text of section 10505, see supra note 10.
102. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10103 (1982)).
103. See 49 U.S.C. § 10103 (1982).
104. 830 F.2d at 1237 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
105. See id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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point to the ICC's revocation authority as proof of the preemptive
power of the ICC's "ongoing jurisdiction."'10 6 Any suggestion from this
section that Congress intended the ICC to retain exclusive jurisdiction
over remedies is remote. The section merely provides that "[t]he Commission may revoke an exemption, to the extent it specifies, when it
finds that application of a provision of this subtitle . . .is necessary to
carry out the [national] transportation policy .... .107 Although the
power given by Congress to the ICC to revoke an exemption is broad,
there is no suggestion, either express or implied, that Congress intended this power to ,exclude the courts from providing common-law
remedies.10 8 As Judge Aldisert observed: "If the ICC subsequently determines that rail carriers are abusing an exemption or that common law
actions are advancing results inconsistent with the national transportation policy.., the Commission canrevoke the exemption and reimpose
09
regulation on the relevant rail traffic."'
For Congress to have preempted common-law remedies during an
exemption, it should have provided expressly for such preemption in
the statement of general jurisdiction, or in the exemption and revocation provisions. Because of the absence of express or compelling congressional intent, the strong presumption against preemption of
common-law claims should have prevailed.
The G & T court next erroneously argued that "[r]ecognition of a
common law remedy with respect to rates would have the effect of substituting a court's regulation for the commission's decision in favor of
deregulation.""l 0 Although this argument can be construed to be either
an irreconcilable conflict-preemption argument or a primary jurisdiction
argument, it appears that the court intended it only as the former. As a
primary jurisdiction issue, the court would have needed to examine the
specific, factual nature of G & T's claims,"'I which it failed to do.
As a preemption argument, however, the court's conclusion cannot
withstand the Supreme Court's analysis in Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp. 112
Prior to Silkwood, the Supreme Court held that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission had occupied the field of nuclear safety, and that states
were preempted from regulating safety requirements of nuclear power
106. Id. at 1235'(citing 49 U.S.C. § 10505(d) (1982)).
107. 49 U.S.C. § 10505(d) (1982). For the full text of the relevant portions
of section 10505, see supra note 10.
108. Cf New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415-17
(1973) (text and legislative history to Federal Work Incentive Program amending Social Security Act insufficient to show congressional intent to preempt all
state work programs).
109. 830 F.2d at 1240 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1235.

111. See K.

DAVIS,

supra note 80, at § 22-2.

112. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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plants." 13 In Silkwood, the Court upheld a $10 million punitive damages
award despite Kerr-McGee's argument that punitive damages imposed
de facto state regulation upon the safety of nuclear power plants, and
should therefore be preempted."t 4 The Court acknowledged the regulatory effect of common-law, punitive damage awards;"11 5 however, the
Court held that, absent express or compelling congressional intent,
common-law claims are preserved in their entirety." t 6 The Court confederal
cluded that Congress intended to permit some tension between
1 17
and state powers, and that it was bound by Congress' intent. '
In G & T, even if common-law claims for rate discrimination during
an exemption were to have a regulatory effect," 18 there is no express or
compelling congressional intent that they be preempted." t 9 On the
contrary, as Judge Aldisert correctly pointed out, common-law claims
are entirely consistent with Congress' intent to prohibit unlawful discrimination during exemptions. 120 And as Judge Aldisert also noted,
the potentially crippling burdens placed on shippers, such as requiring a
shipper to seek revocation of an exemption before it can obtain remedies from the ICC, cannot be implied to have been the intent of Congress given the plain language of the Staggers Rail Act prohibiting
unlawful discrimination. 12 The Third Circuit should have accepted as
113. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
114. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249 (citing San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ("[R]egulation can be as effectively exerted
through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief.")).
115. 464 U.S. 256. The Court explained that "[i]t may be that the award of
damages based on the-state law of negligence or strict liability is regulatory in
the sense that a nuclear plant will be threatened with damages liability if it does
not conform to state standards .. " Id.
116. Id. at 255. The Court stated: "[P]unitive damages have long been a
part of traditional state tort law . . . [and] Congress assumed that traditional

principles of state tort law would apply with full force unless they were expressly
supplanted." Id.
117. Id. at 256. The court concluded:
[N]o doubt there is tension between the conclusion that safety regulation is the exclusive concern of the Federal law and the conclusion that
a State may nevertheless award damages based on its own law of liability. But as we understand what was done over the years in the legislation concerning nuclear energy, Congress intended to stand by both
concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there was between them. We
can do no less.
Id.

118. See 830 F.2d at 1235. Judge Aldisert argues strenuously that adjudication by a court is not defacto regulation, but this position fails to take into account the Silkwood analysis. See id. at 1240-41 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a
summary of Judge Aldisert's argument, see supra note 73-75 and accompanying
text.
119. For an analysis of the lack of express or compelling congressional intent, see supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
120. 830 F.2d at 1237 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1238-39 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discussion of judge Al-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 8

652

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. 635

permissible the tension that is created when common-law claims are allowed, as the Supreme Court did in Silkwood.
Had the Third Circuit reached this result, it would then have been
necessary for the court to determine whether G & T was still required to
present its claims initially to the ICC under the doctrine of primaryjurisdiction. Courts have the power to notice this doctrine despite the fact
that the parties have not raised it. 1 22 Because G & T's claims are based
strictly on a common-law, common-carrier theory of unlawful discrimination which states that a common carrier is prohibited-from charging
different rates for identical services, 123 such claims are fully within the
court's competence to resolve and would not require the special expertise of the ICC. The G & T court should have permitted the claims.
This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co. ,124 and in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 125 In Pennsylvania Railroad, a plaintiff shipper brought
a common-law action for unjust discrimination against a carrier for the
carrier's failure to provide a pro rata share of rail cars, in violation of the
carrier's own rule against discrimination. 126 The Court held that where
the discrimination alleged is a violation of a rule which is fair on its face
and is not challenged as unfair, the dispute raises only questions of fact,
and are therefore not within the ICC's primary jurisdiction and may be
pursued in federal or state court as a breach of the common-law duty
not to discriminate. 127 In Nader, the plaintiff brought a common-law action against Allegheny Airlines for being "bumped" from a flight. 12 8
He argued that the Airline's failure to disclose its practice of deliberate
overbooking was a fraudulent misrepresentation. 12 9 The Court held
that the claim was within the competence of the courts to resolve, and
that it did not require an initial determination whether deliberate
overbooking was an "unfair practice," which would have been within the
primary jurisdiction of the then existing Civil Aeronautics Board. 130 In
G & T's case, there are no intricate issues of rate reasonableness to be
disert's approach to the absence of remedies under the Staggers Rail Act, see
supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Distrigas v. Boston Gas Co., 693 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir.
1982) ("It is now well established that the doctrine is not waived by the failure of
the parties to present it in the trial court, or on appeal, since the doctrine exists
for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies
and not for the convenience of the parties.").
123. See generally 13 AM. JUR. 2d Carriers § 175 (1964).
124. 237 U.S. 121 (1914).
125. 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
126. Pennsylvania R.R., 237 U.S. at 122-23.
127. Id. at 131-32.
128. Nader, 426 U.S. at 292-94.
129. Id. at 295.
130. Id. at 299-300.
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resolved by the ICC, or to be left to the marketplace. 1 3 ' G & T's allegation that Conrail attached a surcharge on shipments to G & T in retaliation for damage claims rightfully brought by G & T presents a
straightforward tort claim for unjust discrimination. The Third Circuit
should have denied Conrail's motion for summary judgment and permitted G & T to proceed with its claim.
CONCLUSION

The Third Circuit improperly held that G & T's common-law claims
of unjust discrimination were preempted during the exemption period.
By failing to distinguish between express preemption and implied preemption, 13 2 and between implied preemption and primary jurisdiction, 13 3 the court reached its result without establishing a sufficient
showing of congressional intent. Deregulation, as a relatively new phenomenon, presents novel questions with respect to federal supremacy,
and it is essential that in resolving these questions courts respect and
retain the delicate federal balance which has become an integral part of
the doctrine of federal preemption. The strong presumption against
preemption of traditional state functions in the absence of express or
compelling congressional intent should be given clear recognition by
the courts in cases which involve deregulation.
William A. Threadgill
13 1. There may be certain issues of reasonableness which arguably are beyond both the courts or the ICC to regulate because of the administrative decision to exempt traffic from regulation; however, it does not appear that the
instant case present such an issue, in light of Congress' overriding intent to prohibit unjust discrimination during periods of exemption. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 10505(a)(1) (1982).
132. For a discussion of the need for the court to make this distinction, see
supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
133. For the court's merging of these two doctrines, see supra notes 83-93

& 110-11 and accompanying text.
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